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The European Union (EU) prohibits, in principle, state aid 
that affects cross-border transactions. In order for this 
prohibition to be effective it must be enforced on both 
sides of the border. This is one of the reasons why the EU 
systematically inserts provisions on state aid in the trade 
agreements it signs with third countries. 
Through those agreements EU rules spread beyond the 
Union’s borders. But EU rules also tend to spread simply 
because the EU is a “regulatory activist” and the single 
European market is very large. Bradford (2012) argued in 
a seminal article entitled the “Brussels Effect” that the EU 
exercises an unseen but keenly felt power to regulate 
global markets (see also Damro 2012 for a similar 
argument focusing on the internal market).  By setting 
the rules that govern products sold in the world’s richest 
single market, it also forces producers in third countries 
to manufacture and supply goods ranging from food to 
chemicals according to its regulations. It thus effectively 
determines international regulatory standards. 
The Brussels effect is not limited to goods. It extends to 
other policy areas such as the rules on data protection or 
on competition. For example, Articles 61-63 of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement contain 
provisions on state aid that mirror those of the EU’s. And 
so do association agreements such as that with Ukraine 
(see Article 262). 
A question that has arisen since the United Kingdom (UK) 
referendum of 23 June 2016 triggering the Brexit is 
whether the UK will retain the current state aid regime 
after it leaves the EU. In the short term and at least until 
31 December 2020, the answer is in the affirmative. In the 
longer term and regardless of whether formal state aid 
rules will be explicitly included in a future agreement of 
cooperation between the EU and the UK, the UK is likely to 
maintain in some form the EU’s state aid regime. This 
prediction is based on two reasons: the first is the likely 
spillover of the EU’s rules into UK policies; the second is 
that it will be mostly in the UK’s interests to keep a similar 
if not the same set of rules as those of the EU. After all, the 
EU will continue to be its main trade partner and 
prevention of trade-distorting state aid will help the UK to 
avoid countervailing tariffs by the EU.  
This policy brief first discusses short-term legacy effects of 
EU state aid rules on the UK before considering the longer 
term spillovers of the EU’s single market and competition 
rules to the UK. It concludes that because of the needs to 
prevent a ‘hard’ border between Ireland and Northern 
Ireland and avoid distortions to competition between its 
devolved administrations, state aid rules are likely to be 
retained in the UK. 
Executive Summary 
> After its withdrawal from the European Union, the 
United Kingdom is likely to maintain a state aid 
regime that is similar to that of the EU. 
 
> This is because the EU will require the UK to prevent 
distortions to bilateral trade caused by state aid 
and to preserve frictionless movement of goods 
and services between Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
 
> It will also be in the interest of the UK to maintain 
rules on state aid so as to avoid countervailing 
duties imposed by the EU in the Word Trade 
Organization framework. 
 
> Moreover, as the devolved administrations within 
the EU acquire more autonomy in economic policy-
making, it is likely that the UK will find it necessary 
to rely on state aid rules to prevent distortions to 
competition within the UK. Since public authorities 
in the UK already comply with EU state aid rules, 
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Transition period and legacy issues 
There is recognition both in the EU and in the UK that 
businesses need time to adjust to Brexit and also that the 
EU and the UK need time to negotiate the terms of their 
future relationship. The extra time is provided by a 
“transition” period. The draft Withdrawal Agreement 
(WA) of 28 February 2018 between the EU and the UK 
provides in Article 122 that EU law will be applicable on 
and in the UK until the end of the transition period and 
that it shall produce the same legal effects in the UK as in 
the EU (European Commission 2018).   
The transition period starts from the expected exit of the 
UK on 30 March 2019 and ends on 31 December 2020. 
Therefore, at least until 31 December 2020, the 
substantive state aid rules will remain the same. But will 
state aid procedures remain the same? 
With respect to proceedings initiated before EU courts, 
Article 82 WA refers to pending cases and clarifies that the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) shall 
continue to have jurisdiction on such cases brought before 
it until the end of the transition period, including requests 
from UK courts for preliminary rulings. Moreover, Article 
85 WA provides that judgments will have a binding force 
also after the transition period. Presumably, this means 
that if a case is lodged before the end of the transition 
period, but the judgment is rendered after the transition 
period, the decision of the CJEU will be enforceable in the 
UK, too. 
With respect to administrative procedures, the picture is 
not so clear. Article 88 WA refers to ongoing 
administrative procedures. It provides that EU institutions 
shall continue to be competent for administrative 
procedures initiated before the end of the transition 
period, whereas Article 91 WA – entitled “binding force 
and enforceability of administrative decisions” – stipulates 
that decisions adopted before the end of the transition 
period shall be binding on and in the UK. It is thus clear 
that procedural rules will continue to apply to the UK until 
31 December 2020 and that the European Commission will 
be empowered to monitor state aid, assess its 
compatibility and order recovery of incompatible aid. 
However, what is not clear is what will happen when a 
procedure is initiated before the end of the transition 
period but concluded after that period is terminated. In 
this respect Article 89 WA provides that EU institutions 
remain competent to initiate new administrative 
procedures where the facts forming the subject matter of 
the administrative procedure occurred before the end of 
the transition period. With respect to state aid, the 
provisions of Article 89 raise two questions. First, will 
decisions of the Commission, say, concluding a formal 
investigation procedure, be enforceable in the UK? If the 
UK does not comply, the Commission will normally have to 
initiate an infringement procedure. Yet, as this will occur 
after the end of the transition period, Article 82 WA will 
not apply and the CJEU will not have jurisdiction. Any 
dispute will have to be resolved by future dispute-
settlement arrangements which are not yet known. 
A second significant question is: will a complaint 
concerning pre-2020 illegal aid that is lodged with the 
Commission after 2020 also be considered as falling within 
the scope of Article 89 WA? It probably will because the 
“facts forming the subject matter” of the administrative 
procedure will have occurred before the end of the 
transition period. This implies that the Commission will be 
able to issue, for instance, a decision instructing recovery 
of aid. But, again, the enforceability of such a decision will 
depend on future dispute-settlement arrangements. 
Given these considerations it is thus likely that EU state aid 
rules will continue to have an impact on the UK economy 
after 2020. 
Spillover effects 
While legacy issues will affect the UK for some time after 
its exit from the EU and also after the end of the transition 
period, the most significant channel through which EU 
state aid rules are likely to spill over into the UK are via a 
formal agreement between the EU and the UK and 
through Northern Ireland. 
Formal agreement 
At a recent event on the impact of Brexit on rules of 
competition, the Global Competition Law Centre (GCLC 
2018) of the College of Europe discussed inter alia state 
aid matters. Speaking on the subject, Margaritis Schinas, 
the chief spokesperson of the European Commission, 
pointed to paragraph 12 of the negotiating guidelines 
given to the Commission by the European Council on 23 
March 2018 (European Council 2018). This paragraph 
states: 
“Given the UK's geographic proximity and economic 
interdependence with the EU27, the future relationship 
will only deliver in a mutually satisfactory way if it includes 
robust guarantees which ensure a level playing field. The 
aim should be to prevent unfair competitive advantage 
that the UK could enjoy through undercutting of levels of 
protection with respect to, inter alia, competition and 
state aid, tax, social, environment and regulatory 
measures and practices. This will require a combination of 
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substantive rules aligned with EU and international 
standards, adequate mechanisms to ensure effective 
implementation domestically, enforcement and dispute 
settlement mechanisms in the agreement as well as Union 
autonomous remedies, that are all commensurate with 
the depth and breadth of the EU-UK economic 
connectedness” (emphasis added). 
The EU thus clearly wants the UK to retain a state aid 
regime that mirrors or bears close resemblance to its own. 
The panel on state aid at the GCLC event discussed how 
effective enforcement could be achieved in the UK after it 
leaves the EU. The prevailing view was that a 
supranational mechanism was necessary, even if the UK 
would be likely to entrust the Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA) with responsibility on state aid. At 
present, CMA decisions can be appealed to the 
Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT), which is an 
independent court. In turn, the decisions of the CAT can be 
appealed to the various appeals courts of the UK, 
depending on where the cases arise. The issue that UK 
courts will be inevitably confronted to is whether and how 
their rulings ought to be aligned to those of EU courts to 
ensure consistent and uniform interpretation. 
The Northern Ireland channel 
The draft Withdrawal Agreement also contains a Protocol 
on Ireland/Northern Ireland. Avoidance of a visible border 
between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland is 
politically very significant. It is acknowledged by both sides 
that the exit of the UK from the EU should not create a 
legal lacuna in Northern Ireland. For this reason, Article 
168 WA stipulates that the Protocol on Ireland/Northern 
Ireland shall apply as from the end of the transition period. 
Article 9 of the Protocol requires that “the provisions of 
Union law on aids granted by States listed in Annex 2.9 to 
this Protocol shall apply to the United Kingdom in respect 
of Northern Ireland. For the purposes of those provisions, 
“‘in respect of Northern Ireland’ means that only measures 
that affect trade between the territory of Northern Ireland 
and the Union shall be considered as aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU”. 
Although Annex 2.9 is still empty, it is rather likely that the 
EU will demand that the same state aid rules apply to 
either side of the border. This immediately raises the 
important question whether the UK will or should seek to 
apply different rules concerning state aid in the rest of the 
UK without causing competition distortions in the trade 
between Northern Ireland and other regions of the UK. 
Since it is not obvious how different sets of rules can be 
applied in different regions of the same country without 
leading to distortions of competition, it can be tentatively 
concluded that the EU’s state aid rules will,  through 
Northern Ireland, spill over to the rest of the UK. 
Article 9 of the Protocol does not touch on the 
enforcement of the aid and the rules that will be listed in 
Annex 2.9. However, it will be difficult for the same UK 
authority to apply two sets of rules if they are not 
consistent with each other. 
Will it be in the UK’s interest to deviate from the EU’s 
regime? 
At the recent GCLC event, there was also discussion on 
whether the UK would want to maintain the EU’s state aid 
regime. Several panellists observed that the UK has had a 
very good compliance record, and it would be in its own 
narrow interests to maintain the status quo. In the 
absence of agreed rules on state aid, UK companies 
receiving state aid in the future would be exposed to the 
risk of countervailing measures by the EU within the World 
Trade Organization framework on subsidies. 
However, it was also pointed out that if the UK chooses to 
maintain a state aid regime in the future, this does not 
imply that the rules will be identical to those of the EU. 
Among others, the UK could deviate with respect to the 
definition of assisted areas, the weight it will attach to 
market distortions caused by state aid, the assessment of 
the ‘common interest’ and the thresholds for individual 
notification laid down in the General Block Exemption 
Regulation (Regulation 651/2014). The UK’s rekindled 
interest in industrial policy was also highlighted as well as 
recent proposals for tax incentives, some of which could 
be linked to setting up operations in enterprise zones. 
The panel did not examine the important issue of how 
different future UK rules can be from EU rules without 
becoming liable to countervailing measures and how to 
ensure equivalence between the two sets of rules also 
within the EU legal order. At this stage it is impossible to 
know how far the UK may want to deviate from EU rules. 
In addition, a question that did not receive the attention it 
deserved was how much competition between its 
devolved administrations the UK would be prepared to 
tolerate in the absence of a state aid regime like that of 
the EU. At present, the UK does not need to establish 
national rules on subsidies granted by England, Scotland, 
Wales or Northern Ireland. However, if it leaves the EU 
without any formal agreement in place, then the issue that 
the UK will be confronted to is whether it should tolerate 
a subsidy competition such as that which takes place 
between the individual states of the United States. There 
is ample evidence that the US regime results in significant 
waste of public resources (see, e.g., Myers & Kent 2001).  
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Ultimately, these are not difficult policy issues. It will not 
hurt the UK to maintain the status quo which, after all, 
seeks to ensure that competition is fair and unfettered. 
But what appears now not to be difficult from the 
perspective of pursuing efficient policies may prove to be 
politically too costly in the future. Much will depend on the 
provisions of the agreement between the EU and the UK 
on their future relationship. 
Conclusion 
The 30th of March 2019 will be a sad day for the EU. 
However, regardless of sentiment, the exit of the UK is not 
likely to signify a similar exit from the EU’s state aid 
regime. At least until the end of the transition period on 
31 December 2020, both sides agree in principle that EU 
law, including competition rules, will apply to the UK. 
After the end of the transition period, state aid rules will 
continue to be enforced in Northern Ireland to ensure 
frictionless trade across the Irish border. This will make it 
difficult for the UK not to adopt similar rules in the rest of 
the UK. The EU wants state aid rules to be included in the 
agreement on its future relationship with the UK so as to 
maintain a level playing field for companies on both sides 
of the English channel. But even if the EU does not demand 
state aid rules to be included in this agreement, it will be 
in the UK’s own interests to retain the present state aid 
regime to prevent distortions to competition caused by 
subsidies granted by its devolved administrations. A state 
aid regime will also act as an insurance policy to protect 
the UK from countervailing action by the EU. 
What of course is unknown at this stage is whether the UK 
will apply precisely the same rules as those of the EU, as is 
currently the practice in the EEA, or if it will enforce 
different but equivalent rules. A significant deviation is 
unlikely. But it cannot be excluded that UK authorities may 
have to adjust aspects of the rules such as the eligibility 
criteria for granting aid. 
What is also unknown at this stage is the institutional 
structure for resolving disputes between the EU and the 
UK. There is hardly any doubt that some form of dispute 
resolution will be necessary. The unknown factor is how 
much each side will try to avoid or insist on, respectively, 
involvement of the CJEU. 
With respect to domestic enforcement of state aid 
discipline, it is likely that the UK’s competition and markets 
authority will be given the task of monitoring and 
authorising compatible aid. Although the credentials of 
the CMA as a competition enforcer are beyond doubt, it 
will have to develop in-house expertise to deal with state 
aid. Because of its track record and independence, it is the 
best-placed authority in the UK to ensure that subsidies do 
not distort transactions and investment decisions within 
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